

Moreover, if, for reasons that will immediately become apparent, I have spoken especially about societies with permanent masks (Zuñi, Kwakiutl), we must not forget that in Australia, as elsewhere, temporary masquerades are simply ceremonies with masks that are not permanent. In these men fashion for themselves a superimposed 'personality' (*personnalité*), a true one in the case of ritual, a feigned one in the case of play-acting. Yet, as between the painting of the head and frequently of the body, and the wearing of a robe and a mask, there is only a difference in degree, and none in function. In both cases all has ended in the enraptured representation of the ancestor.

What is more, the presence or absence of the mask are more distinguishing marks of a social, historical and cultural arbitrariness, so to speak, than basic traits. Thus the Kiwai, the Papuans of the Isle of Kiwai, possess admirable masks, even rivalling those of the Tlingit of North America, whilst their not very distant neighbours, the Marind-Anim, have scarcely more than one *single* mask, which is entirely simple, but enjoy admirable celebrations of fraternities and clans, of people decorated from top to toe, unrecognizable because of their adornment.

Let us conclude this first part of our demonstration. Plainly what emerges from it is that a whole immense group of societies have arrived at the notion of 'role' (*personnage*), of the role played by the individual in sacred dramas, just as he plays a role in family life. The function had already created the formula in very primitive societies and subsists in societies at the present day. Institutions like that of the 'retired', seals of the Kwakiutl, usages like that of the Arunta, who relegate to the people of no consequence he who can no longer dance, 'he who has lost his Kabara', are entirely typical.

Another aspect which I am still somewhat ignoring is that of the notion of the reincarnation of a number of spirits that bear names in a determinate number, into the bodies of a determinate number of individuals. Nevertheless, B. and C. G. Seligman have rightly published the papers of Deacon, who had observed the phenomenon in Melanesia. Rattray had seen it among the Ashanti Ntoro.<sup>16</sup> I should like to state to you that M. Maupoil has found in this one of the most important elements in the cult of the Fa (Dahomey and Nigeria). All this, however, I am omitting.

Let us move on from the notion of 'role' (*personnage*) to the notion of 'person' (*personne*) and of 'self' (*moi*).

### III: The Latin 'persona'

You all know how normal and classical is the notion of the Latin *persona*: a mask, a tragic mask, a ritual mask, and the ancestral mask. It dates back to the beginnings of Latin civilisation.

I have to show you how indeed the notion has become one shared also by us. The space, the time and the differences that separate that origin from this terminal point are considerable. Evolutions and revolutions pile up upon one another, this time in history, according to precise dates, for causes, plain to see, which we are about to describe. In one place this category of the mind has wavered, in another it has set down deep roots.

Even among the very great and ancient societies which first became conscious of it, two of them, so to speak, invented it, only to allow it to fade away almost irrevocably. All this occurred in the last centuries B.C. The examples are edifying: they concern Brahmanic and Buddhist India, and ancient China.

#### India

India appears to me indeed to have been the most ancient of civilisations aware of the notion of the individual, of his consciousness – may I say, of the 'self' (*moi*). *Ahamkāra*, the "creation of the 'I' " (*je*), is the name of the individual consciousness; *aham* equals 'I' (*je*): It is the same Indo-European word as 'ego'. The word *ahamkāra* is clearly a technical word, invented by some school of wise seers, risen above all psychological illusions. The *sāṃkhya*, the school which in point of fact must have preceded Buddhism, maintains the composite character of things and minds (*sāṃkhya* actually means 'composition'), esteeming that the 'self' (*moi*) is the illusory thing. For its part, Buddhism, in a first phase of its history, laid down that it was a mere composite, capable of division and of being resolvable into the *skandha*, and sought after its annihilation in the monk.

The great Brahmanic schools of the Upanishads – assuredly predating the *sāṃkhya* itself, as well as the two orthodox forms of the Vedānta which follow them – all start from the maxim of the 'seers' (*voyants*), right up to the dialogue of Vishnu in the Bhagavad Gītā demonstrating the truth to Arjuna: *tat tvam asi*, which corresponds almost word for word to the English, 'that thou art' (the universe). Even the later Vedic ritual and the commentaries upon it were already imbued with these metaphysics.

#### China

About China I know only what Marcel Granet, my colleague and friend, has been kind enough to inform me. Even today nowhere is more account

taken of the individual, and particularly of his social status, nowhere is he more rigorously categorized. What Granet's admirable studies reveal to us about ancient China is the strength and grandeur of institutions comparable to those of the American North-West. Birth-order, rank and the interplay of the social classes settle the names and life style of the individual, his 'face', as is still said, in terms that we are also beginning to employ. His individuality is his *ming*, his name. China has preserved these archaic notions, yet at the same time has removed from individuality every trace of its being eternal and indissoluble. The name, the *ming*, represents a collective noun, something springing from elsewhere: one's corresponding ancestor bore it, just as it will fall to the descendant of its present bearer. Whenever they have philosophized about it, whenever in certain metaphysical schools they have attempted to explain what it is, they have said of the individual that he is a composite, made up of *shen* and *kwei* – two other collective nouns – in this life. Taoism and Buddhism also went down this road, and the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) ceased to evolve.

Other nations have known or adopted ideas of the same kind. Those who have made of the human person a complete entity, independent of all others save God, are rare.

The most important were the Romans. In our view it was there, in Rome, that this latter idea was worked out.

#### IV: The 'persona'

In contrast to the Hindus and the Chinese, the Romans, or perhaps rather the Latins, seem to be the people who in part established the notion of 'person' (*personne*), the designation for which has remained precisely the Latin word. From the very outset we are transported into the same systems of facts as those mentioned before, but already in a new form: the 'person' (*personne*) is more than an organisational fact, more than a name or a right to assume a role and a ritual mask. It is a basic fact of law. In law, according to the legal experts, there are only *personae*, *res* and *actiones*: this principle still regulates the divisions between our codes of law. Yet this outcome is the result of particular evolution in Roman law.

Somewhat rashly, this is the way I can envisage this state of affairs to have arisen.<sup>17</sup> It does seem that the original meaning of the word was exclusively that of 'mask'. Naturally the explanation of Latin etymologists, that *persona*, coming from *per/sonare*, is the mask through which (*per*) resounds the voice (of the actor) is a derivation invented afterwards – although we do distinguish between *persona* and *persona muta*, the

silent role in drama and mime. In reality the word does not even seem to be from a sound Latin root. It is believed to be of Etruscan origin, like other nouns ending in '-na' (Porsenna, Caecina, etc.). Meillet and Ernout's *Dictionnaire Etymologique* compares it to a word, *farsu*, handed down in garbled form, and M. Benveniste informs me that it may come from a Greek borrowing made by the Etruscans, *πρόσωπον* ('perso'). Yet it is the case that materially even the institution of masks, and in particular of masks of ancestors, appears mainly to have had its home in Etruria. The Etruscans had a 'mask' civilization. There is no comparison between the masses of wooden masks and of those in terra cotta – the wax ones have vanished – the masses of effigies of sleeping or seated ancestors found in the excavations made of the vast Tyrrhenian kingdom, and those found at Rome, in the Latium, or in Greater Greece (Graecia Magna) – moreover, in my view, these are very frequently of Etruscan manufacture.

Yet if it is not the Latins who invented the word and the institutions, at least it was they who gave it the original meaning which has become our own. This was the process that occurred.

Firstly, among them are to be found definite traces of institutions of the same kind as ceremonies of clans, masks and paints with which the actors bedeck themselves according to the names they bear. At least one of the great rituals of earliest Rome corresponds exactly to the common type whose salient forms we have depicted. This is that of the *Hirpi Sorani*, the wolves of the Soracte (*Hirpi* is the name of the wolf in Samnite). Festus (93, 25) states: *Irpini appellati nomine lupi, quem irpum dicunt Samnites; eum enim ducem secuti agros occupavere*. ('They are called Irpini, the name of the wolf, which the Samnites call *irpus*; following a wolf they arrived at their later domain'.)<sup>18</sup>

Members of the families who bore that title walked on burning coals at the sanctuary of the goddess Feronia, and enjoyed privileges, including exemption from taxation. Sir James Frazer already speculated that they were the remnants of an ancient clan, which had become a fraternity, bearing names, and wearing skins and masks. Yet there is something else: it seems that we are truly in the presence of the very myth of Rome. 'Acca Larentia', the old woman, the mother of the Lares, who was honoured at the Larentalia (December) is none other than the *indigitamentum*, the secret name of the Roman She-Wolf, the mother of Romulus and Remus (Ovid, *Fastes*, I, 55 ff).<sup>19</sup> A clan, dances, masks, a name, names, a ritual. I accept that the facts are divided somewhat into two elements: a fraternity which survives, and a myth which recounts what preceded the foundation of Rome itself. But the two parts form a complete whole. The

study of other Roman *collegia* would permit other hypotheses. All in all, Samnites, Etruscans and Latins still lived in an environment we have just left, from *personae*, masks and names, and individual rights to rituals and privileges.

From this to the notion of 'person' (*personne*) but a single step needs to be taken. It was perhaps not taken immediately. I imagine that legends like that of the consul Brutus and his sons and the end of the right of the *pater* to kill his sons, his *sui*, signify the acquisition of the *persona* by the sons, even while their father was still alive. I believe that the revolt of the Plebs, the right to full citizenship that, following upon the sons of senatorial families, was gained by all the plebeian members of the *gentes*, was decisive. All freemen of Rome were Roman citizens, all had a civil *persona*; some became religious *personae*; some masks, names and rituals remained attached to some privileged families of the religious *collegia*.

Yet another custom arrived at the same final state: that of forenames, surnames and pseudonyms (nicknames). The Roman citizen had a right to the *nomen*, the *praenomen* and the *cognomen* that his *gens* assigned to him. A forename, for example, might signify the birth-order of the ancestor who bore it: Primus, Secundus. The sacred name – *nomen*, *numen* – of the *gens*; the *cognomen*, the pseudonym (nickname) – not surname – such as Naso, Cicero, etc.<sup>20</sup> A *senatus-consultus* decision determined (clearly there must have been some abuses) that one had no right to borrow and adorn oneself with any other forename of any other *gens* than one's own. The *cognomen* followed a different historical course: it ended by confusing *cognomen*, the pseudonym that one might bear, with *imago*, the wax mask moulded upon the face, the *πρόσωπον* of the dead ancestor kept in the wings of the *aula* of the family house. For a long time the use of these masks and statues must have been reserved for patrician families, and in fact, even more so than in law, it does not appear to have spread very widely among the plebeians. It is rather usurpers and foreigners who adopt *cognomina* which did not belong to them. The very words *cognomen* and *imago* are, in a manner of speaking, indissolubly linked in formulas that were almost in current use. I give below one of the facts – in my view typical – which was my starting point for all this research, one which I found without even looking for it. It concerns a doubtful individual, Staienus, against whom Cicero is pleading on behalf of Cluentius. This is the scene. *Tum appellat hilari vultu hominem Bulbus, ut placidissime potest. "Quid tu, inquit, Paete?" Hoc enim sibi Staienus cognomen ex imaginibus Aeliorum delegerat ne sese Ligurem fecisset,*

*nationis magis quam generis uti cognomine videretur.*<sup>21</sup> Paetus is a *cognomen* of the Aelii, to which Staienus, a Ligurian, had no right, and which he usurped in order to conceal his nationality and to make believe that he was of an ancestry other than his own. Usurpation of 'person' (*personne*), fictitiousness of 'person' (*personne*), title and affiliation.

One of the finest documents, and among the most authentic, signed in the bronze by Claudius the emperor (just as the Tables of Ancyre of Augustus have come down to us), the Table of Lyons (48 A.D.) containing the imperial oration on the senatorial decision *de Jure honorum Gallis dando*, concedes to the young Gaulish senators freshly admitted to the Curia the right to the *imagines* and *cognomina* of their ancestors. Now they will have nothing more to regret. Such as Persicus, 'my dear friend' (who had been obliged to choose this foreign pseudonym [nickname]. . . . lacking this senatorial decision) and who can now *inter imagines majorum suorum Allobrogici nomen legere* ('choose his name of Allobrogicus among the "images" of his ancestors').

To the very end the Roman Senate thought of itself as being made up of a determinate number of *patres* representing the 'persons' (*personnes*), the 'images' of their ancestors.

It is to the *persona* that is attributed the property of the *simulacra* and the *imagines*.<sup>22</sup>

Along with them the word *persona*, an artificial 'character' (*personnage*), the mask and role of comedy and tragedy, of trickery and hypocrisy – a stranger to the 'self' (*moi*) – continued on its way. Yet the personal nature of the law had been established,<sup>23</sup> and *persona* had also become synonymous with the true nature of the individual.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, the right to the *persona* had been established. Only the slave is excluded from it. *Servus non habet personam*. He has no 'personality' (*personnalité*). He does not own his body, nor has he ancestors, name, *cognomen*, or personal belongings. Old Germanic law still distinguished him from the freeman, the *Leibeigen*, the owner of his body. But at the time when the laws of the Saxons and Swabians were drawn up, if the serfs did not possess their body, they already had a soul, which Christianity had given them.

But before turning to Christianity, we must trace back another source of enrichment, in which not only the Latins participated, but also their Greek collaborators, their teachers and interpreters. With Greek philosophers, and Roman nobles and legal experts it is altogether a different edifice that is erected.

### V: The 'person' (*personne*): a moral fact

Let me make myself plain: I think that this effort, this step forward, came about above all with the help of the Stoics, whose voluntarist and personal ethics were able to enrich the Roman notion of the 'person' (*personne*), and was even enriched itself whilst enriching the law.<sup>25</sup> I believe, but unfortunately can only begin to prove it, that the influence of the Schools of Athens and Rhodes on the development of Latin moral thinking cannot be exaggerated, and, conversely, the influence of Roman actions and of the educational needs of young Romans on the Greek thinkers. Polybius and Cicero already attest to this, as do later Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and others.

The word *πρόσωπον* did indeed have the same meaning as *persona*, a mask. But it can then also signify the 'personage' (*personnage*) that each individual is and desires to be, his character (the two words are often linked), the true face. From the second century B.C. onwards it very quickly assumes the meaning of *persona*. Translating exactly and legally *persona*, it still retains the meaning of a superimposed image; for example, in the case of the figure at the prow of a boat (among the Celts, etc.). But it also signifies the human, even divine, 'personality' (*personnalité*). It all depends upon the context. The word *πρόσωπον* is extended to the individual, with his nature laid bare and every mask torn away, and, nevertheless, there is retained the sense of the artificial: the sense of what is the innermost nature of this 'person' (*personne*), and the sense of what is the 'role-player' (*personnage*).

Everything about the classical Latin and Greek Moralists (200 B.C. to 400 A.D.) has a different ring to it. *πρόσωπον* is no longer only a *persona*, and – a matter of capital importance – to its juridical meaning is moreover added a moral one, a sense of being conscious, independent, autonomous, free and responsible. Moral conscience introduces consciousness into the juridical conception of law. To functions, honours, obligations and rights is added the conscious moral 'person' (*personne*). In this respect I am perhaps more venturesome, and yet more clear-cut than M. Brunschvicg, who, in his great work, *Le Progrès de la Conscience*, has often touched upon these matters.<sup>26</sup> For me the words designating first consciousness and then psychological consciousness, the *συνείδησις*-*τὸ συνειδός* are really Stoic, seem technical and clearly translate *consciūs*, *conscientia* in Roman law. We may even perceive, between the early phase of Stoicism and that of the Greco-Latin era, the progress and changes definitely accomplished by the age of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In one of the original meanings of *accomplire*, 'he who has seen with

one', *σύνειδε*, as a witness, we have passed to the meaning of the 'consciousness of good and evil'. In current use in Latin, the word finally takes on this meaning with the Greeks, with Diodorus of Sicily, Lucian and Dionysus of Halycarnassus, and self-consciousness (*conscience de soi*) has become the attribute of the moral person. Epictetus still keeps the meaning of the two images which this civilisation had worked on, when he writes what Marcus Aurelius quotes, 'carve out your mask', put on your 'role' (*personnage*), your 'type', your 'character', when he suggested to him what has become with us the examination of conscience. Renan saw the importance of this moment in the life of the Mind.<sup>27</sup>

But the notion of 'person' (*personne*) still lacked any sure metaphysical foundation. This foundation it owes to Christianity.

### VI: The Christian 'person' (*personne*)

It is Christians who have made a metaphysical entity of the 'moral person' (*personne morale*), after they became aware of its religious power. Our own notion of the human person is still basically the Christian one. Here I need only follow the excellent book of Schlossman.<sup>28</sup> He clearly saw – after others, but better than they did – the transition from the notion of *persona*, of 'a man clad in a condition', to the notion of man, quite simply, that of the human 'person' (*personne*).

Moreover, the notion of a 'moral person' had become so clear that, from the very beginning of our era, and even earlier at Rome and throughout the Empire, it was applied to all non-real 'personalities' (*personnalités*) – what we still call by the term 'moral persons' ('legal entities'): corporations, religious foundations, etc., which have become 'persons' (*personnes*). The word *πρόσωπον* designated them right up to the New Laws and most recent Constitutions. A *universitas* is a 'collective person' (*une personne de personnes*), but like a city, like Rome, it is a 'thing', an entity. Indeed as Cicero (*De Officiis*, I, 34) says: *Magistratus gerit personam civitatis*. And von Carolsfeld compares and comments very aptly upon the Epistle to the Galatians, Ch. 3, v. 28: 'You are, with respect to the one, neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor freeman, male nor female, for you are all one person, *εἷς*, in Christ Jesus.'

The question was raised regarding the unity of the 'person' (*personne*), and the unity of the Church, in relationship to the unity of God. (*εἷς*). It was resolved after many discussions. It is the entire history of the Church that would have here to be retraced (cf. Suidas, s.v., and the passages of the celebrated Discourse upon the Epiphany by St Gregory of Nazianzus, 39, 630,A).<sup>29,30</sup> It is the quarrel concerning the Trinity, the Mono-

physite dispute, which continued for a long while to exercise men's minds and which the Church resolved by taking refuge in the divine mystery, although however with decisive firmness and clarity: *Unitas in tres personas, una persona in duas naturas*, the Council of Nicea pronounced definitively. Unity of the three persons – of the Trinity – unity of the two natures of Christ. It is from the notion of the 'one' that the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) was created – I believe that it will long remain so – for the divine persons, but at the same time for the human person, substance and mode, body and soul, consciousness and act.<sup>31</sup>

I shall not comment further, or prolong this theological study. Cassiodorus ended by saying very precisely: *persona – substantia rationalis individua* (Psalmum VII). The person is a rational substance, indivisible and individual.<sup>32</sup>

It remained to make of this rational, individual substance what it is today, a consciousness and a category.

This was the work of a long study by philosophers, which I have only a few minutes left to describe.<sup>33</sup>

#### VII: The 'person' (*personne*): a psychological being

Here I hope I may be forgiven if, summarising a certain amount of personal research and countless views the history of which might be traced back, I put forward more ideas than proofs.

However, the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) was still to undergo a further transformation to become what it has become over less than one and a half centuries, the "category of 'self' " (*moi*). Far from existing as the primordial innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in the innermost depths of our being, it continues here slowly, and almost right up to our own time, to be built upon, to be made clearer and more specific, becoming identified with self-knowledge and the psychological consciousness.

All the long labours of the Church, of churches and theologians, of the Scholastic philosophers and the Renaissance philosophers – disturbed by the Reformation – even brought about some delay, setting up some obstacles to the creation of the idea that this time we believe to be clear. Up to the seventeenth and even up to the end of the eighteenth century, the mentality of our ancestors is obsessed with the question of knowing whether the individual soul is a substance, or supported by a substance: whether it is the nature of man, or whether it is only one of the two natures of man; whether it is one and indivisible, or divisible and separable; whether it is free, the absolute source of all action, or whether it is determined, fettered by other destinies, by predestination. Anxiously they

wonder whence it came, who created it and who directs it. And in the arguments between sects, between coteries in both the great institutions of the Church and in the philosophical schools, we do hardly any better than the results achieved in the fourth century A.D. Fortunately the Council of Trent put a stop to futile polemics regarding the personal creation of each individual soul.

Moreover, when we speak of the precise functions of the soul it is to thought, thought that is discursive, clear and deductive, that the Renaissance and Descartes address themselves in order to understand their nature. It is thought that contains the revolutionary *Cogito ergo sum*; this it is that constitutes Spinoza's opposition of the 'extension' to 'thought'.

Even Spinoza<sup>34</sup> continued to hold precisely the idea of Antiquity regarding the immortality of the soul. We know that he does not believe in the survival after death of any part of the soul other than that which is imbued with 'the intellectual love of God'. Basically he was reiterating Maimonides, who was repeating Aristotle (*De Anima*, 408,6; cf. 430 a; *Generation of Animals*, trans. A.L. Peck [1943], Heinemann [London] and Harvard University Press, II, 3, p. 736 b). Only the noetic soul can be eternal, since the other two souls, the vegetative and the sensory, are necessarily linked to the body, and the energy of the body does not penetrate into the *voûs*. At the same time, by a natural opposition that Brunschvicg<sup>35</sup> has effectively highlighted, it is Spinoza who, better than Descartes, better than Leibnitz himself, because he posed above all else the ethical problem, has the soundest view of the relationships of the individual consciousness with things and with God.

It is elsewhere, and not among the Cartesians, but in other circles that the problem of the 'person' (*personne*) who is only consciousness has found its solution. We cannot exaggerate the importance of sectarian movements throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the formation of political and philosophical thought. There it was that were posed the questions regarding individual liberty, regarding the individual conscience and the right to communicate directly with God, to be one's own priest, to have an inner God. The ideas of the Moravian Brothers, the Puritans, the Wesleyans and the Pietists are those which form the basis on which is established the notion: the 'person' (*personne*) equals the 'self' (*moi*); the 'self' (*moi*) equals consciousness, and is its primordial category.

All this does not go back very far. It was necessary to have Hume revolutionizing everything (following Berkeley, who had begun to do so) before one could say that in the soul there were only 'states of conscious-

ness', 'perceptions'. Yet he ended up by hesitating when faced with the notion of 'self' (*moi*)<sup>36</sup> as the basic category of consciousness. The Scots adapted his ideas better.

Only with Kant does it take on precise form. Kant was a Pietist, a follower of Swedenborg, the pupil of Tetens, a feeble philosopher but a well-informed psychologist and theologian. He found the indivisible 'self' (*moi*) all around him. Kant posed the question, but did not resolve it, whether the 'self' (*moi*), *das Ich*, is a category.

The one who finally gave the answer that every act of consciousness was an act of the 'self' (*moi*), the one who founded all science and all action on the 'self' (*moi*), was Fichte. Kant had already made of the individual consciousness, the sacred character of the human person, the condition for Practical Reason. It was Fichte<sup>37</sup> who made of it as well the category of the 'self' (*moi*), the condition of consciousness and of science, of Pure Reason.

From that time onwards the revolution in mentalities was accomplished. Each of us has our 'self' (*moi*), an echo of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which had predated both Kant and Fichte.

### VIII: Conclusion

From a simple masquerade to the mask, from a 'role' (*personnage*) to a 'person' (*personne*), to a name, to an individual; from the latter to a being possessing metaphysical and moral value; from a moral consciousness to a sacred being; from the latter to a fundamental form of thought and action – the course is accomplished.

Who knows what progress the Understanding will yet make on this matter? We do not know what light will be thrown on these recent problems by psychology and sociology, both already well advanced, but which must be urged on even more.

Who knows even whether this 'category', which all of us here believe to be well founded, will always be recognised as such? It is formulated only for us, among us. Even its moral strength – the sacred character of the human 'person' (*personne*) – is questioned, not only throughout the Orient, which has not yet attained the level of our sciences, but even in the countries where this principle was discovered. We have great possessions to defend. With us the idea could disappear. But let us refrain from moralising.

Yet do not let us speculate too much. Let us say that social anthropology, sociology, history – all teach us to perceive how human thought 'moves on' (Meyerson). Slowly does it succeed in expressing itself, through

time, through societies, their contacts and metamorphoses, along pathways that seem most perilous. Let us labour to demonstrate how we must become aware of ourselves, in order to perfect our thought and to express it better.

### Notes

Mauss's notes have been corrected and elaborated by Ben Brewster, in his translation of Mauss's essays, *Sociology and Psychology* (1979: Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), which we have largely followed in our presentation of the notes here.

- Two theses of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes have already touched upon problems of this nature: Charles le Coeur, *Le Culte de la génération en Guinée* (vol. 45 of the Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses); and V. Larock, *Essai sur la Valeur sacrée et la Valeur sociale des noms de personnes dans les Sociétés inférieures* (Paris 1932).
- H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*, Preface, 1908.
- On the respective dates of the different civilizations which have occupied this area of the 'basket people', the 'cliff dwellers', the people of the ruins of the 'mesa' and finally of the 'pueblo' (of square and circular shape), a good exposition of likely recent hypotheses is to be found in F. H. H. Roberts, 'The Village of the great Kivas on the Zuñi Reservation', *Bulletin of American Ethnology*, No. 111, 1932, Washington, p. 23 ff. Also, by the same author, 'Early Pueblo Ruins', *Bulletin of American Ethnology*, 1930, No. 90, p. 9.
- Cushing, Frank Hamilton (1896), 'Outlines of Zuñi Creation Myths', *13th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1891–2, Washington, D.C., pp. 371–2.
- See also G. Davy, *Foi jurée* (Paris 1922); Mauss, 'Essai sur le Don', *Année Sociologique*, 1923, where I was not able to emphasise, because it was outside my subject, the fact of the 'person' (*personne*), his rights, duties and religious powers, nor the succession of names, etc. Neither Davy nor I were able either to insist on the fact that the potlatch not only comprises 'exchanges' of men and women, inheritances, contracts, property, ritual services, and first, especially, dances and initiations – but also, ecstatic trances, states of possession by the eternal and incarnate spirits. *Everything, even war and conflicts, takes place only between the bearers of these hereditary titles, who incarnate these souls.*
- Boas, 'Ethnology of the Kwakiutl', *35th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, 1913–14, Washington, 1921, p. 431.
- Boas, Franz (1921), 'Ethnography of the Kwakiutl based on data collected by George Hunt', *35th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1913–14, p. 823.
- The best general exposition of Boas is to be found in 'The Social Organisation and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians', *Report of the U.S. National Museum*, 1895, p. 396 ff. See also pages 465, 505, and 658.
- The last shutter opens to reveal if not his whole face, at least in any case his mouth, and most frequently his eyes and mouth. (See Boas article cited in Note 6, p. 628, fig. 195)
- See Boas article, Note 6, pp. 792–801.
- P. Radin, 'The Winnebago Tribe', *37th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, V:246, gives the names of the Buffalo clan and in the following pages those of the other clans. Note especially the distribution of the first four to six forenames for men, and those for women. See also other lists, dating from J.O. Dorsey's work.