

A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self

Marcel Mauss

(translated by W. D. Halls)

I: The subject¹: the 'person' (*personne*)

My audience and readers will have to show great indulgence, for my subject is really enormous, and in these fifty-five minutes I shall be able only to give you some idea of how to treat it. It deals with nothing less than how to explain to you the way in which one of the categories of the human mind – one of those ideas we believe to be innate – originated and slowly developed over many centuries and through numerous vicissitudes, so that even today it is still imprecise, delicate and fragile, one requiring further elaboration. This is the idea of 'person' (*personne*), the idea of 'self' (*moi*). Each one of us finds it natural, clearly determined in the depths of his consciousness, completely furnished with the fundamentals of the morality which flows from it. For this simplistic view of its history and present value we must substitute a more precise view.

A note on the principle underlying these kinds of research

In so doing you will see an example – one that is perhaps not up to what you expected – of the work of the French school of sociology. We have concentrated most especially on the social history of the categories of the human mind. We attempt to explain them one by one, using very simply, and as a temporary expedient, the list of Aristotelian categories² as our point of departure. We describe particular forms of them in certain civilisations and, by means of this comparison, try to discover in what consists their unstable nature, and their reasons for being as they are. It was in this way that, by developing the notion of *mana*, Hubert and I believed we had found not only the archaic basis for magic, but also the very

general, and probably very primitive, form of the notion of cause. It was in this way that Hubert described certain features of the notion of time. Likewise our much regretted colleague, friend and pupil, Czarnowski, began – but, alas, never finished – his theory of the ‘parcelling out of extension’, in other words, of one of the features and certain aspects of the notion of space. Likewise also, my uncle and teacher, Durkheim, has dealt with the notion of the *whole*, after we had examined together the notion of *genus*. I have been preparing for many years studies on the notion of substance. Of these I have published only a very recondite extract which is not worth reading in its present form. I will mention to you also the numerous times that Lucien Lévy-Bruhl has touched upon these questions in those works of his which deal with the primitive mentality, especially, as regards our subject, what he has termed ‘the primitive mind’ (*l’âme primitive*). He, however, does not concentrate on the study of each special category, not even on the one we are going to study. But rather, in reviewing all of them, including the category of ‘self’, does he seek particularly to ascertain what element of the ‘pre-logical’ is contained in this study of the mentality of peoples, in relation to anthropology and ethnology rather than history.

If you will permit me, let us proceed more methodically and restrict ourselves to the study of one single category, that of the ‘self’ (*moi*). This will be amply sufficient. In the present short space of time, I shall conduct you, with some daring and at inordinate speed, across the world and through time, guiding you from Australia to our European societies, from extremely ancient history to that of our own times. More extensive research studies could be undertaken, each one of which could be gone into much more deeply, but I can only claim to show you how such research might be organised. What I intend to do is to provide you with a summary catalogue of the forms that the notion has assumed at various times and in various places, and to show you how it has ended up by taking on flesh and blood, substance and form, an anatomical structure, right up to modern times, when at last it has become clear and precise in our civilisations (in our European ones, almost in our lifetime), but not yet in all of them. I can only rough out the beginnings of the sketch or the clay model. I am still far from having finished the whole block or carved the finished portrait.

Thus I shall not discuss the linguistic problem which, for the sake of completeness, should indeed be tackled. In no way do I maintain that there has ever been a tribe, a language, in which the term ‘I’, ‘me’ (*je*,

moi) (you will note that we still decline it with two words) has never existed, or that it has not expressed something clearly represented. This is far from the case: as well as possessing the pronoun, a very large number of languages are conspicuous for their use of many ‘positional’ suffixes, which deal for the most part with the relationships existing in time and space between the speaker (the subject) and the object about which he is speaking. Here the ‘self’ (*moi*) is everywhere present, but is not expressed by ‘me’ (*moi*) or ‘I’ (*je*). However, in this vast domain of languages my scholarship is only mediocre. My investigation will concern solely law and morality.

Nor shall I speak to you of psychology, any more than I shall of linguistics. I shall leave aside everything which relates to the ‘self’ (*moi*), the conscious personality as such. Let me merely say that it is plain, particularly to us, that there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical. The psychology of this awareness has made immense strides over the last century, for almost a hundred years. All neurologists, French, English and German, among them my teacher Ribot, our esteemed colleague Head, and others, have amassed a great deal of knowledge about this subject and the way this particular awareness is formed, functions, deteriorates, deviates and dissolves, and about the considerable part it plays.

My subject is entirely different, and independent of this. It is one relating to social history. Over the centuries, in numerous societies, how has it slowly evolved – not the sense of ‘self’ (*moi*) – but the notion or concept that men in different ages have formed of it? What I wish to show you is the succession of forms that this concept has taken on in the life of men in different societies, according to their systems of law, religion, customs, social structures and mentality.

One thing may alert you to the drift of my exposition: I shall show you how recent is the word ‘self’ (*moi*), used philosophically; how recent “the category of ‘self’ ” (*moi*), “the cult of the ‘self’ ” (*moi*) (its aberration); and how recent even “the respect of ‘self’ ” (*moi*), in particular the respect of others (its normal state).

Let us therefore draw up a classification. Making no claim to reconstitute a general history from pre-historical times to the present day, let us first study some of the forms assumed by the notion of ‘self’ (*moi*). We shall then launch into historical times with the Greeks and work out from there some definite linkages. Beforehand, with no other concern save that

of logic, we will make an excursion into that kind of museum of facts (I dislike the word 'survivals', when it is used for institutions still active and proliferating) which ethnography affords us.

II: The 'role' (*personnage*), and the place of the 'person' (*personne*)

The Pueblos

Let us start with the fact that has been the point of departure for all this research. I borrow it from the Pueblo Indians, the Zuñi – or more accurately from those of the Pueblo of Zuñi, so admirably studied by Frank Hamilton Cushing (who was fully initiated into the Pueblo), and by Mathilda Cox Stevenson and her husband for a great number of years. Their work has been criticised, but I believe it to be reliable and, in any case, unique. It is true that there is nothing 'very primitive' about things. The 'Cities of Cibola' were once converted to Christianity and have preserved their baptismal registers. Yet, at the same time they have practised their ancient laws and religions – almost in the 'aboriginal state', if one may say so: this was roughly that of their predecessors, the cliff dwellers and the inhabitants of the 'mesa' as far as Mexico. In their material civilisation and social constitution they were, and have remained, very comparable to the Mexicans and to the most civilised Indians of the two Americas. 'Mexico, that Pueblo', writes admirably the great L. H. Morgan, who was so unfairly treated, and yet the founder of our disciplines.³

The document below is by Frank Hamilton Cushing,⁴ an author much criticised, even by his colleagues at the Bureau of American Ethnology. Yet, knowing his published work and having considered very carefully what has appeared on the Zuñi and the Pueblo in general, strengthened also by what I believe I know about a large number of American societies, I persist in considering him one of the best portrayers of societies of all time.

If you will allow me, I will pass over everything concerning the orientation and distribution of the characters (*personnages*) in the ritual, although this has very great importance, to which we have already drawn attention elsewhere. But I cannot omit two points:

The existence of a limited number of forenames in each clan; and the definition of the exact rôle played by each one in the 'cast-list' of the clan, and expressed by that name.

In each clan is to be found a set of names called the names of childhood. These names are more of titles than of cognomens. They are determined

upon by sociologic and divinistic modes, and are bestowed in childhood as the 'verity names' or titles of the children to whom given. But this body of names relating to any one totem – for instance, to one of the beast totems – will not be the name of the totem beast itself, but will be names both of the totem in its various conditions and of various parts of the totem, or of its functions, or of its attributes, actual or mythical. Now these parts of functions, or attributes of the parts or functions, are subdivided also in a six-fold manner, so that the name relating to one member of the totem – for example, like the right arm or leg of the animal thereof – would correspond to the north, and would be the first in honor in a clan (not itself of the northern group); then the name relating to another member – say to the left leg or arm and its powers, etc. – would pertain to the west and would be second in honor; and another member – say the right foot – to the south and would be third in honor; and of another member – say the left foot – to the east and would be fourth in honor; to another – say the head – to the upper regions and would be fifth in honor; and another – say the tail – to the lower region and would be sixth in honor; while the heart or the navel and center of the being would be first as well as last in honor. The studies of Major Powell among the Maskoki and other tribes have made it very clear that kinship terms, so called, among other Indian tribes (and the rule will apply no less or perhaps even more strictly to the Zuñis) are rather devices for determining relative rank or authority as signified by relative age, as elder or younger, of the person addressed or spoken of by the term of relationship. So that it is quite impossible for a Zuñi speaking to another to say simply brother; it is always necessary to say elder brother or younger brother, by which the speaker himself affirms his relative age or rank; also it is customary for one clansman to address another clansman by the same kinship name of brother-elder or brother-younger, uncle or nephew, etc.; but according as the clan of the one addressed ranks higher or lower than the clan of the one using the term of address, the word-symbol for elder or younger relationship must be used.

With such a system of arrangement as all this may be seen to be, with such a facile device for symbolizing the arrangement (not only according to number of the regions and their subdivisions in their relative succession and the succession of their elements and seasons, but also in colours attributed to them, etc.) and, finally, with such an arrangement of names correspondingly classified and of terms of relationship significant of rank rather than of consanguinal connection, mistake in the order of a ceremonial, a procession or a council is simply impossible, and the people employing such devices may be said to have written and to be writing their statutes and laws in all their daily relationships and utterances.

Thus, on the one hand, the clan is conceived of as being made up of a certain number of persons, in reality of 'characters' (*personnages*). On the other hand, the role of all of them is really to act out, each insofar as it concerns him, the prefigured totality of the life of the clan.

So much for persons and the clan. The 'fraternities' are even more complicated. Among the Pueblo of Zuñi, and clearly among the others too – the Pueblos of Sia and Tusayan, in the Hopi tribe, those of Walpi and Mishongnovi – the names do not merely correspond to the organisation of the clan, its processions and ceremonies, whether private or public. They correspond principally to ranks in the fraternities, in what the original terminology of Powell and the Bureau of American Ethnology designated 'Fraternities', viz., 'Secret Societies', which we might very exactly compare to the Colleges of the Roman Religion. There were preparations in secret, and numerous solemn rituals reserved for the Society of the Men (Kaka or Koko, Koyemshi, etc.), but also public demonstrations – almost theatrical performances – and, especially at Zuñi, and above all among the Hopi, mask dances, particularly those of the Katchina. These were visits of spirits, represented by their delegates upon earth, who bore their titles. All this, which has now become a spectacle for tourists, was still very much alive less than fifty years ago, and is so even today.

Miss B. Freire Marecco (now Mrs Aitken) and Mrs E. Clew Parsons continue to add to our knowledge and to corroborate it.

Moreover, let us add that these lives of individuals, the driving force of clans and of the societies superimposed upon them, not only sustain the life of things and of the gods, but the 'propriety' of things. They not only sustain the life of men, both here and in the after-life, but also the rebirth of individuals (men), sole heirs of those that bear their forenames (the reincarnation of women is a completely different matter). Thus, in short, you will understand that with the Pueblo we already see a notion of the 'person' (*personne*) or individual, absorbed in his clan, but already detached from it in the ceremonial by the mask, his title, his rank, his role, his survival and his reappearance on earth in one of his descendants endowed with the same status, forenames, titles, rights and functions.

The American North-West

If I had time, another group of American tribes would well deserve in this study a detailed analysis of the same facts. These are the tribes of the American North-West – and it is to the great credit of your Royal Anthropological Institute and the British Association to have instigated a complete analysis of their institutions. This was begun by Dawson, the great geologist, and so magnificently continued, if not completed, by the great works of Boas and his Indian assistants, Hunt and Tate, and by those of Sapir, Swanton and Barbeau, etc.

Here also is posed, in different terms but ones identical in nature and function, the same problem – that of the name, the social position and the legal and religious 'birthright' of every free man, and even more so, of every noble and prince.

I shall take as a starting-point the best known of these important societies, the Kwakiutl, and confine myself only to some broad facts.

One word of caution: just as with the Pueblos, so also with the Indians of the North-West, we must not think of anything in any way primitive. Firstly, one section of these Indians, in fact those in the North, the Tlingit and Haida, speak languages which according to Sapir are tonal languages related to those derived from a root which it has been agreed to call proto-Sino-Tibetan-Burman. And even, if I may tell you of one of my impressions as an ethnographer – if not an 'armchair' one, at least a 'museum' one – I have a very strong recollection of a display exhibit concerning the Kwakiutl, the work of the esteemed Putnam, one of the founders of the ethnological section of the American Museum of Natural History. It was a very large ceremonial boat, with figures life-size, with all their religious and legal paraphernalia, which represented the Hamatse, the cannibal princes, arriving from the sea to carry out a ritual – doubtless a marriage. With their very rich robes, their crowns of red cedar bark, their crewmen less sumptuously attired but nonetheless magnificent, they gave me an exact impression of what, for example, Northern China in the very remote past might have looked like. I believe that this boat, with its somewhat romanticised representations, is no longer exhibited; it is no longer the fashion in our ethnographic museums. No matter, for at least this one had had its effect upon me. Even the Indian faces vividly recalled to me the faces of the 'Paleo-Asiatics' (so called because we do not know under what to classify their languages). And, from this point in civilisation and of settlement, we have still to reckon with many long and varied developments, revolutions and new formations that our esteemed colleague, Franz Boas, perhaps with undue haste, is attempting to trace back.

The fact remains that all these Indians, and in particular the Kwakiutl, installed in their settlements a whole social and religious system where, in a vast exchange of rights, goods and services, property, dances, ceremonies, privileges and ranks, persons as well as groups give satisfaction to one another. We see very clearly how, from classes and clans, 'human persons' adjust to one another and how, from these, the gestures of the actors in a drama fit together. Here *all* the actors are theoretically the sum total of *all* free men. But this time the drama is more than an aes-

thetic performance. It is religious, and at the same time it is cosmic, mythological, social and personal.

Firstly, as with the Zuni, every individual in each clan has a name, even two names, for each season, one profane (summer) (WiXsa), and one sacred (winter) (LaXsa). These names are distributed between the various families, the 'Secret Societies' and the clans cooperating in the rituals, occasions when chiefs and families confront each other in innumerable and interminable *potlatch*,⁵ about which I have attempted elsewhere to give some idea. Each clan has two complete sets of its proper names, or rather its forenames, the one commonly known, the other secret, but which itself is not simple. This is because the forename, actually of the noble, changes with his age and the functions he fulfils as a consequence of that age.⁶ As is said in an oration, made, it is true, about the clan of the Eagles, i.e. about a kind of privileged group among privileged clans:

For that they do not change their names starts from (the time) when long ago // Ō* maxt!ālaLē*, the ancestor of the numaym G ig ilgam of the / Q!ōmoyā'yē, made the seats of the Eagles; and those went down to the / numayms. And the name-keeper Wiltse*stala says, / 'Now our chiefs have been given everything, and I will go right down (according to the order of rank).' / Thus he says, when he gives out the property; for I will just name the names // of one of the head chiefs of the numayms of the / Kwakiutl tribes. They never change their names from the beginning, / when the first human beings existed in the world; for names can not go out / of the family of the head chiefs of the numayms, only to the eldest one / of the children of the head chief. //

What is at stake in all this is thus more than the prestige and the authority of the chief and the clan. It is the very existence of both of these and of the ancestors reincarnated in their rightful successors, who live again in the bodies of those who bear their names, whose perpetuation is assured by the ritual in each of its phases. The perpetuation of things and spirits is only guaranteed by the perpetuating of the names of individuals, of persons. These last only act in their titular capacity and, conversely, are responsible for their whole clan, their families and their tribes. For instance, from conquest in war are acquired: a rank, a power, a religious and aesthetic function, dancing and demoniacal possession, *paraphernalia*, and copper objects in the form of buckler shields – real crown shapes in copper, important currency for present and future *potlatch*: it suffices to kill the one possessing them, or to seize from him one of the trappings of ritual, robes or masks, so as to inherit his names, his goods, his obli-

gations, his ancestors, his 'person' (*personne*), in the fullest sense of the word.⁸ In this way ranks, goods, personal rights, and things, as well as their particular spirit, are acquired.

This huge masquerade in its entirety, this whole drama, this complicated ballet of ecstatic states, concerns as much the past as the future, becomes a test for its performer, and proof of the presence within him of the *naualaku*, an element of an impersonal force, or of the ancestor, or of the personal god, in any case of the superhuman power, spiritual and ultimate. The *potlatch* of victory, of the copper won by conquest, correspond to the impeccable dance, to a successful state of possession.

There is no time left to develop all these subjects. Almost from an anecdotal viewpoint, I would like to draw your attention to an institution, an object commonly found from the Nootka right up to the Tlingit of North Alaska. This is the use of those remarkable shutter masks, which are double and even triple, which open up to reveal the two or three creatures (totems placed one upon the other) personified by the wearer of the mask.⁹ You can see some very fine examples of them in the British Museum. And all those celebrated totem poles, those soapstone pipes, etc., all those objects which have become rubbishy goods designed for the tourists brought there by train or on cruises – all these may be analysed in the same way. A pipe I believe to be Haida in origin, one to which I have hardly given any attention, in point of fact represents a young initiate in his pointed headdress, presented by his spirit father, likewise behatted, bearing the grampus. Beneath the one initiated, to whom they are subordinate in descending order: a frog – doubtless his mother – and a crow, doubtless his maternal grandfather.

We shall not deal with the very important case of change of name during a lifetime – particularly that of a noble. It would entail expounding a whole succession of curious facts regarding substitution: the son, a minor, is temporarily represented by his father, who assumes provisionally the spirit of the deceased grandfather. Here also we would need to set out a complete proof of the presence among the Kwakiutl of dual uterine and male descent, and of the system of alternate and displaced generations.

Moreover, it is very remarkable that among the Kwakiutl (and their nearest kin, the Heiltsuk, the Bellacoola, etc.) every stage of life is named, personified by a fresh name, a fresh title, whether as a child, an adolescent or an adult, both male and female. Thus one may possess a name as a warrior (naturally this does not apply to women), as a prince or princess, as a chief or a female chieftain. There is a name for the feast that

men and women give, and for the particular ceremonial that belongs to them, for their age of retirement, their name in the society of seals (those retired: no states of ecstasy or possession, no responsibilities, no gains, save those arising from past memories). Finally is named *their* 'secret society', in which they are protagonists (a bear – frequent among women, who are represented in it by their menfolk or their sons – wolves, Hamatse [cannibals], etc.). Names are also given to: the chief's house, with its roofs, posts, doors, ornamentation, beams, openings, double-headed and double-faced snake, the ceremonial boat, the dogs. To the lists set out in the *Ethnology of the Kwakiutl*¹⁰ it must be added that the dishes, the forks, the copper objects, everything is emblazoned, endowed with life, forming part of the *persona* of the owner and of the *familia*, of the *res* of his clan.

We have singled out the Kwakiutl, and in general the peoples of the North-West, because they really do represent the extremes, an excessiveness which allows us better to perceive the facts than in those places where, although no less essential, they still remain small-scale and involuted. Yet we must understand that a large part of the Americans of the prairies, in particular the Sioux, possess institutions of this kind. Thus the Winnebago, who have been studied by our colleague Radin, have in point of fact these successions of forenames, which are determined by clans and families, who distribute them according to a certain order, but always following precisely a kind of logical distribution of attributes or powers and natures,¹¹ founded upon the myth of the origin of the clan, and legitimating the right of some person or another to assume the role.

Below is an example of this origin of the names of individuals which Radin gives in detail in his model autobiography of *Crashing Thunder*:

Now in our clan whenever a child was to be named it was my father who did it. That right he now transmitted to my brother.

Earthmaker, in the beginning, sent four men from above and when they came to this earth everything that happened to them was utilized in making proper names. This is what our father told us. As they had come from above so from that fact has originated a name Comes-from-above; and since they came like spirits we have a name Spirit-man. When they came, there was a drizzling rain and hence the names Walking-in-mist, Comes-in-mist, Drizzling-rain. It is said that when they came to Within-lake they alighted upon a small shrub and hence the name Bends-the-shrub; and since they alighted on an oak tree, the name Oak-tree. Since our ancestors came with the thunderbirds we have a name Thunderbird and since these are the animals who cause thunder, we have the name He-who-thunders. Similarly we have Walks-with-a-mighty-tread, Shakes-the-earth-down-with-his-face, Comes-with-wind-and-hail, Flashes-in-every-direction, Only-a-flash-

of-lightning, Streak-of-lightning, Walks-in-the-clouds, He-who-has-long-wings, Strikes-the-tree.

Now the thunderbirds come with terrible thunder-crashes. Everything on earth, animals, plants everything, is deluged with rain. Terrible thunder-crashes resound everywhere. From all this a name is derived and that is my name – Crashing-Thunder.¹²

Each one of the names of the thunder birds which divide up the different elements of the thunder totem is that of ancestors who are perpetually reincarnated. (We even have a story of two reincarnations.)¹³ The men who reincarnate them are intermediaries between the totemic animal and the protecting spirit, and the things emblazoned and the rites of the clan or of the great 'medicines'. All these names and bequeathals of 'roles' (*personnalités*) are determined by revelations whose limits, indicated by his grandmother or the elders, are known to the beneficiary beforehand. We discover, if not the same facts, at least the same kind of facts, almost everywhere in America. We could continue this exposition for the world of the Iroquois and the Algonquin, etc.

Australia

It is preferable to revert for a moment to more summary and more primitive facts. Two or three items concern Australia.

Here also the clan is in no way conceived to be entirely reduced to an impersonal, collective being, the totem, represented by the animal species and not by individuals – on the one hand men, on the other, animals.¹⁴ Under its human aspect it is the fruit of the reincarnation of spirits that have migrated and are perpetually being reborn in the clan. (This is true for the Arunta, the Loritja and the Kakadu, etc.) Even among the Arunta and the Loritja, these spirits are reincarnated with very great precision at the third generation (grandfather-grandson) and at the fifth, where grandfather and great-great-grandson are homonyms. Here again it is the fruit of uterine descent crossed with male descent. We can, for example, study in the distribution of names by individuals, clans and exact matrimonial category (eight Arunta categories) the relationship of these names to the eternal ancestors, to the *ratapa*, in the form they take at the moment of conception, in the foetus and in the children that they bring to the light of day, and between the names of these *ratapa* and those of adults (which are, in particular, those of the functions fulfilled at clan and tribal ceremonies).¹⁵ The art underlying all these kinds of distribution is not only to arrive at religion, but also to define the position of the individual in the rights he enjoys and his place in the tribe, as in its rites.

Moreover, if, for reasons that will immediately become apparent, I have spoken especially about societies with permanent masks (Zuñi, Kwakiutl), we must not forget that in Australia, as elsewhere, temporary masquerades are simply ceremonies with masks that are not permanent. In these men fashion for themselves a superimposed 'personality' (*personnalité*), a true one in the case of ritual, a feigned one in the case of play-acting. Yet, as between the painting of the head and frequently of the body, and the wearing of a robe and a mask, there is only a difference in degree, and none in function. In both cases all has ended in the enrap-tured representation of the ancestor.

What is more, the presence or absence of the mask are more distinguishing marks of a social, historical and cultural arbitrariness, so to speak, than basic traits. Thus the Kiwai, the Papuans of the Isle of Kiwai, possess admirable masks, even rivalling those of the Tlingit of North America, whilst their not very distant neighbours, the Marind-Anim, have scarcely more than one *single* mask, which is entirely simple, but enjoy admirable celebrations of fraternities and clans, of people decorated from top to toe, unrecognizable because of their adornment.

Let us conclude this first part of our demonstration. Plainly what emerges from it is that a whole immense group of societies have arrived at the notion of 'role' (*personnage*), of the role played by the individual in sacred dramas, just as he plays a role in family life. The function had already created the formula in very primitive societies and subsists in societies at the present day. Institutions like that of the 'retired', seals of the Kwakiutl, usages like that of the Arunta, who relegate to the people of no consequence he who can no longer dance, 'he who has lost his Ka-bara', are entirely typical.

Another aspect which I am still somewhat ignoring is that of the notion of the reincarnation of a number of spirits that bear names in a determinate number, into the bodies of a determinate number of individuals. Nevertheless, B. and C. G. Seligman have rightly published the papers of Deacon, who had observed the phenomenon in Melanesia. Rattray had seen it among the Ashanti Ntoro.¹⁶ I should like to state to you that M. Maupoil has found in this one of the most important elements in the cult of the Fa (Dahomey and Nigeria). All this, however, I am omitting.

Let us move on from the notion of 'role' (*personnage*) to the notion of 'person' (*personne*) and of 'self' (*moi*).

III: The Latin 'persona'

You all know how normal and classical is the notion of the Latin *persona*: a mask, a tragic mask, a ritual mask, and the ancestral mask. It dates back to the beginnings of Latin civilisation.

I have to show you how indeed the notion has become one shared also by us. The space, the time and the differences that separate that origin from this terminal point are considerable. Evolutions and revolutions pile up upon one another, this time in history, according to precise dates, for causes, plain to see, which we are about to describe. In one place this category of the mind has wavered, in another it has set down deep roots.

Even among the very great and ancient societies which first became conscious of it, two of them, so to speak, invented it, only to allow it to fade away almost irrevocably. All this occurred in the last centuries B.C. The examples are edifying: they concern Brahmanic and Buddhist India, and ancient China.

India

India appears to me indeed to have been the most ancient of civilisations aware of the notion of the individual, of his consciousness – may I say, of the 'self' (*moi*). *Ahamkāra*, the "creation of the 'I'" (*je*), is the name of the individual consciousness; *aham* equals 'I' (*je*): It is the same Indo-European word as 'ego'. The word *ahamkāra* is clearly a technical word, invented by some school of wise seers, risen above all psychological illusions. The *sāmkhya*, the school which in point of fact must have preceded Buddhism, maintains the composite character of things and minds (*sāmkhya* actually means 'composition'), esteeming that the 'self' (*moi*) is the illusory thing. For its part, Buddhism, in a first phase of its history, laid down that it was a mere composite, capable of division and of being resolvable into the *skandha*, and sought after its annihilation in the monk.

The great Brahmanic schools of the Upanishads – assuredly predating the *sāmkhya* itself, as well as the two orthodox forms of the Vedānta which follow them – all start from the maxim of the 'seers' (*voyants*), right up to the dialogue of Vishnu in the Bhagavad Gītā demonstrating the truth to Arjuna: *tat tvam asi*, which corresponds almost word for word to the English, 'that thou art' (the universe). Even the later Vedic ritual and the commentaries upon it were already imbued with these metaphysics.

China

About China I know only what Marcel Granet, my colleague and friend, has been kind enough to inform me. Even today nowhere is more account

taken of the individual, and particularly of his social status, nowhere is he more rigorously categorized. What Granet's admirable studies reveal to us about ancient China is the strength and grandeur of institutions comparable to those of the American North-West. Birth-order, rank and the interplay of the social classes settle the names and life style of the individual, his 'face', as is still said, in terms that we are also beginning to employ. His individuality is his *ming*, his name. China has preserved these archaic notions, yet at the same time has removed from individuality every trace of its being eternal and indissoluble. The name, the *ming*, represents a collective noun, something springing from elsewhere: one's corresponding ancestor bore it, just as it will fall to the descendant of its present bearer. Whenever they have philosophized about it, whenever in certain metaphysical schools they have attempted to explain what it is, they have said of the individual that he is a composite, made up of *shen* and *kwei* – two other collective nouns – in this life. Taoism and Buddhism also went down this road, and the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) ceased to evolve.

Other nations have known or adopted ideas of the same kind. Those who have made of the human person a complete entity, independent of all others save God, are rare.

The most important were the Romans. In our view it was there, in Rome, that this latter idea was worked out.

IV: The 'persona'

In contrast to the Hindus and the Chinese, the Romans, or perhaps rather the Latins, seem to be the people who in part established the notion of 'person' (*personne*), the designation for which has remained precisely the Latin word. From the very outset we are transported into the same systems of facts as those mentioned before, but already in a new form: the 'person' (*personne*) is more than an organisational fact, more than a name or a right to assume a role and a ritual mask. It is a basic fact of law. In law, according to the legal experts, there are only *personae*, *res* and *actiones*: this principle still regulates the divisions between our codes of law. Yet this outcome is the result of particular evolution in Roman law.

Somewhat rashly, this is the way I can envisage this state of affairs to have arisen.¹⁷ It does seem that the original meaning of the word was exclusively that of 'mask'. Naturally the explanation of Latin etymologists, that *persona*, coming from *per/sonare*, is the mask through which (*per*) resounds the voice (of the actor) is a derivation invented afterwards – although we do distinguish between *persona* and *persona muta*, the

silent role in drama and mime. In reality the word does not even seem to be from a sound Latin root. It is believed to be of Etruscan origin, like other nouns ending in '-na' (Porsenna, Caecina, etc.). Meillet and Ernout's *Dictionnaire Etymologique* compares it to a word, *farsu*, handed down in garbled form, and M. Benveniste informs me that it may come from a Greek borrowing made by the Etruscans, *πρόσωπον* ('perso'). Yet it is the case that materially even the institution of masks, and in particular of masks of ancestors, appears mainly to have had its home in Etruria. The Etruscans had a 'mask' civilization. There is no comparison between the masses of wooden masks and of those in terra cotta – the wax ones have vanished – the masses of effigies of sleeping or seated ancestors found in the excavations made of the vast Tyrrhenian kingdom, and those found at Rome, in the Latium, or in Greater Greece (Graecia Magna) – moreover, in my view, these are very frequently of Etruscan manufacture.

Yet if it is not the Latins who invented the word and the institutions, at least it was they who gave it the original meaning which has become our own. This was the process that occurred.

Firstly, among them are to be found definite traces of institutions of the same kind as ceremonies of clans, masks and paints with which the actors bedeck themselves according to the names they bear. At least one of the great rituals of earliest Rome corresponds exactly to the common type whose salient forms we have depicted. This is that of the *Hirpi Sorani*, the wolves of the Soracte (*Hirpi* is the name of the wolf in Samnite). Festus (93, 25) states: *Irpini appellati nomine lupi, quem irpum dicunt Samnites; eum enim ducem secuti agros occupavere*. ('They are called Irpini, the name of the wolf, which the Samnites call *irpus*; following a wolf they arrived at their later domain'.)¹⁸

Members of the families who bore that title walked on burning coals at the sanctuary of the goddess Feronia, and enjoyed privileges, including exemption from taxation. Sir James Frazer already speculated that they were the remnants of an ancient clan, which had become a fraternity, bearing names, and wearing skins and masks. Yet there is something else: it seems that we are truly in the presence of the very myth of Rome. 'Acca Larentia', the old woman, the mother of the Lares, who was honoured at the Larentalia (December) is none other than the *indigitamentum*, the secret name of the Roman She-Wolf, the mother of Romulus and Remus (Ovid, *Fastes*, I, 55 ff).¹⁹ A clan, dances, masks, a name, names, a ritual. I accept that the facts are divided somewhat into two elements: a fraternity which survives, and a myth which recounts what preceded the foundation of Rome itself. But the two parts form a complete whole. The

study of other Roman *collegia* would permit other hypotheses. All in all, Samnites, Etruscans and Latins still lived in an environment we have just left, from *personae*, masks and names, and individual rights to rituals and privileges.

From this to the notion of 'person' (*personne*) but a single step needs to be taken. It was perhaps not taken immediately. I imagine that legends like that of the consul Brutus and his sons and the end of the right of the *pater* to kill his sons, his *sui*, signify the acquisition of the *persona* by the sons, even while their father was still alive. I believe that the revolt of the Plebs, the right to full citizenship that, following upon the sons of senatorial families, was gained by all the plebeian members of the *gentes*, was decisive. All freemen of Rome were Roman citizens, all had a civil *persona*; some became religious *personae*; some masks, names and rituals remained attached to some privileged families of the religious *collegia*.

Yet another custom arrived at the same final state: that of forenames, surnames and pseudonyms (nicknames). The Roman citizen had a right to the *nomen*, the *praenomen* and the *cognomen* that his *gens* assigned to him. A forename, for example, might signify the birth-order of the ancestor who bore it: Primus, Secundus. The sacred name – *nomen*, *numen* – of the *gens*; the *cognomen*, the pseudonym (nickname) – not surname – such as Naso, Cicero, etc.²⁰ A *senatus-consultus* decision determined (clearly there must have been some abuses) that one had no right to borrow and adorn oneself with any other forename of any other *gens* than one's own. The *cognomen* followed a different historical course: it ended by confusing *cognomen*, the pseudonym that one might bear, with *imago*, the wax mask moulded upon the face, the *πρόσωπον* of the dead ancestor kept in the wings of the *aula* of the family house. For a long time the use of these masks and statues must have been reserved for patrician families, and in fact, even more so than in law, it does not appear to have spread very widely among the plebeians. It is rather usurpers and foreigners who adopt *cognomina* which did not belong to them. The very words *cognomen* and *imago* are, in a manner of speaking, indissolubly linked in formulas that were almost in current use. I give below one of the facts – in my view typical – which was my starting point for all this research, one which I found without even looking for it. It concerns a doubtful individual, Staienus, against whom Cicero is pleading on behalf of Cluentius. This is the scene. *Tum appellat hilari vultu hominem Bulbus, ut placidissime potest. "Quid tu, inquit, Paete?" Hoc enim sibi Staienus cognomen ex imaginibus Aeliorum delegerat ne sese Ligurem fecisset,*

*nationis magis quam generis uti cognomine videretur.*²¹ Paetus is a *cognomen* of the Aelii, to which Staienus, a Ligurian, had no right, and which he usurped in order to conceal his nationality and to make believe that he was of an ancestry other than his own. Usurpation of 'person' (*personne*), fictitiousness of 'person' (*personne*), title and affiliation.

One of the finest documents, and among the most authentic, signed in the bronze by Claudius the emperor (just as the Tables of Ancyre of Augustus have come down to us), the Table of Lyons (48 A.D.) containing the imperial oration on the senatorial decision *de Jure honorum Gallicis dando*, concedes to the young Gaulish senators freshly admitted to the Curia the right to the *imagines* and *cognomina* of their ancestors. Now they will have nothing more to regret. Such as Persicus, 'my dear friend' (who had been obliged to choose this foreign pseudonym [nickname]. . . . lacking this senatorial decision) and who can now *inter imagines majorum suorum Allobrogici nomen legere* ('choose his name of Allobrogicus among the "images" of his ancestors').

To the very end the Roman Senate thought of itself as being made up of a determinate number of *patres* representing the 'persons' (*personnes*), the 'images' of their ancestors.

It is to the *persona* that is attributed the property of the *simulacra* and the *imagines*.²²

Along with them the word *persona*, an artificial 'character' (*personnage*), the mask and role of comedy and tragedy, of trickery and hypocrisy – a stranger to the 'self' (*moi*) – continued on its way. Yet the personal nature of the law had been established,²³ and *persona* had also become synonymous with the true nature of the individual.²⁴

Moreover, the right to the *persona* had been established. Only the slave is excluded from it. *Servus non habet personam*. He has no 'personality' (*personnalité*). He does not own his body, nor has he ancestors, name, *cognomen*, or personal belongings. Old Germanic law still distinguished him from the freeman, the *Leibeigen*, the owner of his body. But at the time when the laws of the Saxons and Swabians were drawn up, if the serfs did not possess their body, they already had a soul, which Christianity had given them.

But before turning to Christianity, we must trace back another source of enrichment, in which not only the Latins participated, but also their Greek collaborators, their teachers and interpreters. With Greek philosophers, and Roman nobles and legal experts it is altogether a different edifice that is erected.

V: The 'person' (*personne*): a moral fact

Let me make myself plain: I think that this effort, this step forward, came about above all with the help of the Stoics, whose voluntarist and personal ethics were able to enrich the Roman notion of the 'person' (*personne*), and was even enriched itself whilst enriching the law.²⁵ I believe, but unfortunately can only begin to prove it, that the influence of the Schools of Athens and Rhodes on the development of Latin moral thinking cannot be exaggerated, and, conversely, the influence of Roman actions and of the educational needs of young Romans on the Greek thinkers. Polybius and Cicero already attest to this, as do later Seneca, Marcus Aurelius and others.

The word *πρόσωπον* did indeed have the same meaning as *persona*, a mask. But it can then also signify the 'personage' (*personnage*) that each individual is and desires to be, his character (the two words are often linked), the true face. From the second century B.C. onwards it very quickly assumes the meaning of *persona*. Translating exactly and legally *persona*, it still retains the meaning of a superimposed image; for example, in the case of the figure at the prow of a boat (among the Celts, etc.). But it also signifies the human, even divine, 'personality' (*personnalité*). It all depends upon the context. The word *πρόσωπον* is extended to the individual, with his nature laid bare and every mask torn away, and, nevertheless, there is retained the sense of the artificial: the sense of what is the innermost nature of this 'person' (*personne*), and the sense of what is the 'role-player' (*personnage*).

Everything about the classical Latin and Greek Moralists (200 B.C. to 400 A.D.) has a different ring to it. *πρόσωπον* is no longer only a *persona*, and – a matter of capital importance – to its juridical meaning is moreover added a moral one, a sense of being conscious, independent, autonomous, free and responsible. Moral conscience introduces consciousness into the juridical conception of law. To functions, honours, obligations and rights is added the conscious moral 'person' (*personne*). In this respect I am perhaps more venturesome, and yet more clear-cut than M. Brunschvicg, who, in his great work, *Le Progrès de la Conscience*, has often touched upon these matters.²⁶ For me the words designating first consciousness and then psychological consciousness, the *συνείδησις-τὸ συνειδός* are really Stoic, seem technical and clearly translate *consciens*, *conscientia* in Roman law. We may even perceive, between the early phase of Stoicism and that of the Greco-Latin era, the progress and changes definitely accomplished by the age of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. In one of the original meanings of *accomplire*, 'he who has seen with

one', *σύνειδε*, as a witness, we have passed to the meaning of the 'consciousness of good and evil'. In current use in Latin, the word finally takes on this meaning with the Greeks, with Diodorus of Sicily, Lucian and Dionysus of Halycarnassus, and self-consciousness (*conscience de soi*) has become the attribute of the moral person. Epictetus still keeps the meaning of the two images which this civilisation had worked on, when he writes what Marcus Aurelius quotes, 'carve out your mask', put on your 'role' (*personnage*), your 'type', your 'character', when he suggested to him what has become with us the examination of conscience. Renan saw the importance of this moment in the life of the Mind.²⁷

But the notion of 'person' (*personne*) still lacked any sure metaphysical foundation. This foundation it owes to Christianity.

VI: The Christian 'person' (*personne*)

It is Christians who have made a metaphysical entity of the 'moral person' (*personne morale*), after they became aware of its religious power. Our own notion of the human person is still basically the Christian one. Here I need only follow the excellent book of Schlossman.²⁸ He clearly saw – after others, but better than they did – the transition from the notion of *persona*, of 'a man clad in a condition', to the notion of man, quite simply, that of the human 'person' (*personne*).

Moreover, the notion of a 'moral person' had become so clear that, from the very beginning of our era, and even earlier at Rome and throughout the Empire, it was applied to all non-real 'personalities' (*personnalités*) – what we still call by the term 'moral persons' ('legal entities'): corporations, religious foundations, etc., which have become 'persons' (*personnes*). The word *πρόσωπον* designated them right up to the New Laws and most recent Constitutions. A *universitas* is a 'collective person' (*une personne de personnes*), but like a city, like Rome, it is a 'thing', an entity. Indeed as Cicero (*De Officiis*, I, 34) says: *Magistratus gerit personam civitatis*. And von Carolsfeld compares and comments very aptly upon the Epistle to the Galatians, Ch. 3, v. 28: 'You are, with respect to the one, neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor freeman, male nor female, for you are all one person, *εἷς*, in Christ Jesus.'

The question was raised regarding the unity of the 'person' (*personne*), and the unity of the Church, in relationship to the unity of God. (*εἷς*). It was resolved after many discussions. It is the entire history of the Church that would have here to be retraced (cf. Suidas, s.v., and the passages of the celebrated Discourse upon the Epiphany by St Gregory of Nazianzus, 39, 630,A).^{29,30} It is the quarrel concerning the Trinity, the Mono-

physite dispute, which continued for a long while to exercise men's minds and which the Church resolved by taking refuge in the divine mystery, although however with decisive firmness and clarity: *Unitas in tres personas, una persona in duas naturas*, the Council of Nicea pronounced definitively. Unity of the three persons – of the Trinity – unity of the two natures of Christ. It is from the notion of the 'one' that the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) was created – I believe that it will long remain so – for the divine persons, but at the same time for the human person, substance and mode, body and soul, consciousness and act.³¹

I shall not comment further, or prolong this theological study. Cassiodorus ended by saying very precisely: *persona – substantia rationalis individua* (Psalmum VII). The person is a rational substance, indivisible and individual.³²

It remained to make of this rational, individual substance what it is today, a consciousness and a category.

This was the work of a long study by philosophers, which I have only a few minutes left to describe.³³

VII: The 'person' (*personne*): a psychological being

Here I hope I may be forgiven if, summarising a certain amount of personal research and countless views the history of which might be traced back, I put forward more ideas than proofs.

However, the notion of the 'person' (*personne*) was still to undergo a further transformation to become what it has become over less than one and a half centuries, the "category of 'self' " (*moi*). Far from existing as the primordial innate idea, clearly engraved since Adam in the innermost depths of our being, it continues here slowly, and almost right up to our own time, to be built upon, to be made clearer and more specific, becoming identified with self-knowledge and the psychological consciousness.

All the long labours of the Church, of churches and theologians, of the Scholastic philosophers and the Renaissance philosophers – disturbed by the Reformation – even brought about some delay, setting up some obstacles to the creation of the idea that this time we believe to be clear. Up to the seventeenth and even up to the end of the eighteenth century, the mentality of our ancestors is obsessed with the question of knowing whether the individual soul is a substance, or supported by a substance: whether it is the nature of man, or whether it is only one of the two natures of man; whether it is one and indivisible, or divisible and separable; whether it is free, the absolute source of all action, or whether it is determined, fettered by other destinies, by predestination. Anxiously they

wonder whence it came, who created it and who directs it. And in the arguments between sects, between coteries in both the great institutions of the Church and in the philosophical schools, we do hardly any better than the results achieved in the fourth century A.D. Fortunately the Council of Trent put a stop to futile polemics regarding the personal creation of each individual soul.

Moreover, when we speak of the precise functions of the soul it is to thought, thought that is discursive, clear and deductive, that the Renaissance and Descartes address themselves in order to understand their nature. It is thought that contains the revolutionary *Cogito ergo sum*; this it is that constitutes Spinoza's opposition of the 'extension' to 'thought'.

Even Spinoza³⁴ continued to hold precisely the idea of Antiquity regarding the immortality of the soul. We know that he does not believe in the survival after death of any part of the soul other than that which is imbued with 'the intellectual love of God'. Basically he was reiterating Maimonides, who was repeating Aristotle (*De Anima*, 408,6; cf. 430 a; *Generation of Animals*, trans. A.L. Peck [1943], Heinemann [London] and Harvard University Press, II, 3, p. 736 b). Only the noetic soul can be eternal, since the other two souls, the vegetative and the sensory, are necessarily linked to the body, and the energy of the body does not penetrate into the *voûs*. At the same time, by a natural opposition that Brunschvicg³⁵ has effectively highlighted, it is Spinoza who, better than Descartes, better than Leibnitz himself, because he posed above all else the ethical problem, has the soundest view of the relationships of the individual consciousness with things and with God.

It is elsewhere, and not among the Cartesians, but in other circles that the problem of the 'person' (*personne*) who is only consciousness has found its solution. We cannot exaggerate the importance of sectarian movements throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for the formation of political and philosophical thought. There it was that were posed the questions regarding individual liberty, regarding the individual conscience and the right to communicate directly with God, to be one's own priest, to have an inner God. The ideas of the Moravian Brothers, the Puritans, the Wesleyans and the Pietists are those which form the basis on which is established the notion: the 'person' (*personne*) equals the 'self' (*moi*); the 'self' (*moi*) equals consciousness, and is its primordial category.

All this does not go back very far. It was necessary to have Hume revolutionizing everything (following Berkeley, who had begun to do so) before one could say that in the soul there were only 'states of conscious-

ness', 'perceptions'. Yet he ended up by hesitating when faced with the notion of 'self' (*moi*)³⁶ as the basic category of consciousness. The Scots adapted his ideas better.

Only with Kant does it take on precise form. Kant was a Pietist, a follower of Swedenborg, the pupil of Tetens, a feeble philosopher but a well-informed psychologist and theologian. He found the indivisible 'self' (*moi*) all around him. Kant posed the question, but did not resolve it, whether the 'self' (*moi*), *das Ich*, is a category.

The one who finally gave the answer that every act of consciousness was an act of the 'self' (*moi*), the one who founded all science and all action on the 'self' (*moi*), was Fichte. Kant had already made of the individual consciousness, the sacred character of the human person, the condition for Practical Reason. It was Fichte³⁷ who made of it as well the category of the 'self' (*moi*), the condition of consciousness and of science, of Pure Reason.

From that time onwards the revolution in mentalities was accomplished. Each of us has our 'self' (*moi*), an echo of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which had predated both Kant and Fichte.

VIII: Conclusion

From a simple masquerade to the mask, from a 'role' (*personnage*) to a 'person' (*personne*), to a name, to an individual; from the latter to a being possessing metaphysical and moral value; from a moral consciousness to a sacred being; from the latter to a fundamental form of thought and action – the course is accomplished.

Who knows what progress the Understanding will yet make on this matter? We do not know what light will be thrown on these recent problems by psychology and sociology, both already well advanced, but which must be urged on even more.

Who knows even whether this 'category', which all of us here believe to be well founded, will always be recognised as such? It is formulated only for us, among us. Even its moral strength – the sacred character of the human 'person' (*personne*) – is questioned, not only throughout the Orient, which has not yet attained the level of our sciences, but even in the countries where this principle was discovered. We have great possessions to defend. With us the idea could disappear. But let us refrain from moralising.

Yet do not let us speculate too much. Let us say that social anthropology, sociology, history – all teach us to perceive how human thought 'moves on' (Meyerson). Slowly does it succeed in expressing itself, through

time, through societies, their contacts and metamorphoses, along pathways that seem most perilous. Let us labour to demonstrate how we must become aware of ourselves, in order to perfect our thought and to express it better.

Notes

Mauss's notes have been corrected and elaborated by Ben Brewster, in his translation of Mauss's essays, *Sociology and Psychology* (1979: Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), which we have largely followed in our presentation of the notes here.

- Two theses of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes have already touched upon problems of this nature: Charles le Coeur, *Le Culte de la génération en Guinée* (vol. 45 of the Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses); and V. Larock, *Essai sur la Valeur sacrée et la Valeur sociale des noms de personnes dans les Sociétés inférieures* (Paris 1932).
- H. Hubert and M. Mauss, *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*, Preface, 1908.
- On the respective dates of the different civilizations which have occupied this area of the 'basket people', the 'cliff dwellers', the people of the ruins of the 'mesa' and finally of the 'pueblo' (of square and circular shape), a good exposition of likely recent hypotheses is to be found in F. H. H. Roberts, 'The Village of the great Kivas on the Zuñi Reservation', *Bulletin of American Ethnology*, No. 111, 1932, Washington, p. 23 ff. Also, by the same author, 'Early Pueblo Ruins', *Bulletin of American Ethnology*, 1930, No. 90, p. 9.
- Cushing, Frank Hamilton (1896), 'Outlines of Zuñi Creation Myths', *13th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1891–2, Washington, D.C., pp. 371–2.
- See also G. Davy, *Foi jurée* (Paris 1922); Mauss, 'Essai sur le Don', *Année Sociologique*, 1923, where I was not able to emphasise, because it was outside my subject, the fact of the 'person' (*personne*), his rights, duties and religious powers, nor the succession of names, etc. Neither Davy nor I were able either to insist on the fact that the potlatch not only comprises 'exchanges' of men and women, inheritances, contracts, property, ritual services, and first, especially, dances and initiations – but also, ecstatic trances, states of possession by the eternal and incarnate spirits. *Everything, even war and conflicts, takes place only between the bearers of these hereditary titles, who incarnate these souls.*
- Boas, 'Ethnology of the Kwakiutl', *35th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, 1913–14, Washington, 1921, p. 431.
- Boas, Franz (1921), 'Ethnography of the Kwakiutl based on data collected by George Hunt', *35th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1913–14, p. 823.
- The best general exposition of Boas is to be found in 'The Social Organisation and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians', *Report of the U.S. National Museum*, 1895, p. 396 ff. See also pages 465, 505, and 658.
- The last shutter opens to reveal if not his whole face, at least in any case his mouth, and most frequently his eyes and mouth. (See Boas article cited in Note 6, p. 628, fig. 195)
- See Boas article, Note 6, pp. 792–801.
- P. Radin, 'The Winnebago Tribe', *37th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, V:246, gives the names of the Buffalo clan and in the following pages those of the other clans. Note especially the distribution of the first four to six forenames for men, and those for women. See also other lists, dating from J.O. Dorsey's work.

12. Note also the same fact, set out differently, in Radin, 'The Winnebago Tribe', p. 194.
13. P. Radin, *Crashing Thunder, The Autobiography of an American Indian*, New York, Appleton, 1926, p. 41.
14. Forms of totemism of this kind are to be found in French West Africa and in Nigeria, the number of manatees and crocodiles in such and such a backwater corresponding to the number of living people. Also probably elsewhere individual animals correspond to the number of individual men.
15. Concerning these three series of names, see the bottom of the five genealogical tables (Arunta), in: Strehlow, *Aranda Stämme*, Vol. 5, Plates. One can follow with interest the case of the Jerrambas (the honey-ant) and the Malbankas (the bearers of the name of civilising hero who was the founder of the wild-cat clan), both of which occur several times in these entirely reliable genealogies.
16. See also the article by Herskovits, 'The Ashanti Ntoro', *J.R.A.I.*, LXVII: 287-96. A good example of the reappearance of names in Bantu country has been cited by E. W. Smith and A. Dale, *The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia*, London, 1920. C.G. and B. Seligman have been constantly aware of this question.
17. The sociologist and historian of Roman law are still hampered by the fact that we have almost no authentic sources for the very earliest law: some fragments from the era of the Kings (Numa) and some pieces from the Law of the Twelve Tables, and then only facts written down very much later. Of the complete Roman law, we only begin to have a certain idea by legal texts duly reported or discovered in the third and second centuries B.C. and even later. Yet we need to conceive of what was the past for the law and the City. Regarding the City and its earliest history, the books of M. Piganiol and M. Carcopino can be used.
18. A clear allusion to a wolf-totem form of the god of cereals (*Roggenwolf*: Germanic). The word 'hirpex' gave 'herse' (cf. 'Lupatum'. Cf. Meillet and Ernout.)
19. Cf. the commentaries of Frazer, ad loc., cf. *ibid.*, p. 453., Acca lamenting over the corpse of Remus killed by Romulus - the foundation of the Lemuria (the sinister feast of the Lemures, of the souls of the dead lying bleeding) - play of words upon Remuria and Lemuria.
20. We should develop further this problem of the relationships at Rome between the 'persona' and the 'imago', and of the latter with the name: 'nomen', 'praenomen', 'cognomen'. We have not sufficient time here. The 'person' (*personne*): this is 'conditio', 'status', 'munus'. 'Conditio' signifies rank (e.g., 'secunda persona Epaminondas', 'the second person after Epaminondas'). 'Status' is one's standing in civil life. 'Munus' signifies one's responsibilities and honours in civil and military life. All this is determined by the name, which is itself determined by family place, class and birth. One should read in 'Fastes', in the translation and admirable commentary of Sir James Frazer, the passage in which the origin of the name of Augustus is dealt with (II, 1. 476; cf. I, line 589), and why Octavius Augustus did not wish to take the name of Romulus, nor that of Quirinus ('qui tenet hoc numen, Romulus ante fuit') and took one which summed up the sacred character of all the others (cf. Frazer, ad loc., line 40). We find there the whole Roman theory regarding names. Likewise in Virgil: Marcellus, son of Augustus, is already named in limbo, where his 'father', Aeneas sees him. Here also should be added a consideration of 'titulus', which is raised in this line. M. Ernout tells me that the word itself might well be of Etruscan origin. Likewise the grammatical notion of 'person' (*personne*) which we still use, 'persona' (Greek *πρόσωπον*, grammarians), should be considered.
21. Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1927), *The Speeches, Pro lege Manilia, Pro Caecina, Pro Cluentio, Pro Rabirio perduellionis* (translated by H. Grose Hodge), London, Heinemann, pp. 296-7. ('Then Bulbus, with a smile on his face, approached Staienus and said in his most ingratiating manner: "Hullo, Pactus!" - for Staienus had adopted the

- surname of Pactus from the family tree of the Aelii for fear that if he styled himself Ligur, it would be thought that his surname came from his race and not his family'.)
22. Pliny, *Natural History*, 35, 43, *Iustiniani Digesta* 19.1.17ff and Lucretius, 4, 296.
23. For further examples of the usurpation of 'praenomina', cf. Suetonius, *Nero*, 1.
24. Thus Cicero, in *Ad Atticum*, says 'naturam et personam mean', and 'personam sceleris' elsewhere.
25. To my knowledge the best book on Stoic ethics is still Bonhöffer, Adolf (1894), *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet*, Stuttgart, Ferdinand Enke.
26. See especially, I, p. 69ff.
27. Renan, Joseph Ernest (1889), 'Examen de conscience philosophique', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Paris, 94, pp. 721-37.
28. Siegmund Schlossman (1906), *Persona und πρόσωπον, im Recht und im Christlichen Dogma*, Leipzig. M. Henri Lévy-Bruhl introduced it to me a long while ago and in so doing has made this whole demonstration easier. See also the first part of Vol. I of Schnorr von Carolsfeld, Ludwig (1933), *Geschichte der juristischen Person*, Munich, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
29. Suidas (1935) *Suidae Lexicon* (edited by Ada Adler), vol. 1, Leipzig. Teubner.
30. Gregory of Nazianzus (1858) 'Εἰς τὰ ἁγία φῶτα or Oratio in Sancta Lumine', *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca* (edited by J.-P. Migne), Paris, Petit-Moutrouge, V. 36, cols 335-60.
31. Cf. the notes of Schlossmann, loc. cit., p. 65, etc.
32. Cf. the *Concursus* of Rusticus. Cassiodorus Senator, Magnus Aurelius (1958), 'Expositio Psalmorum I-LXX', *Magni Aurelii Cassiodore Senatoris Opera*, para. II, 1, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Brepols, Turnholt.
33. Regarding this history, this revolution in the notion of unity, there might be a lot more to say here. Cf. especially the second volume of Brunschvicg, *Progrès de la Conscience*.
34. *Ethics*, Part V, Proposition XL, corollary, Proposition XXIII and scholia, in conjunction with: Pr. XXXIX and scholia, Pr. XXXVIII and scholia, Pr. XXIX and Pr. XXI. The notion of intellectual love comes from Leo Hebraeus, the Florentine Platonist.
35. *Progrès de la Conscience*, I, p. 182 ff.
36. M. Blondel reminds me of the relevance of the notes of Hume, where the latter poses the question of the relationship between 'consciousness and self' (*conscience - moi*). See *Treatise of Human Nature (Of Personal Identity)*.
37. *Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseins* (Winter lecture course, 1810-11) A very fine and very brief summary is to be found in Xavier Léon (1927), *Fichte et son temps*, Vol. III, pp. 161-9.